As a matter of custom, articles on this blog tend to be kept as short as possible. in some ways this hampers the exploration of deeper topics. Alas, there are only so many minutes in the day, and only so much time that can be committed to writing and reading. Brevity is sometimes a lost art form.
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Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) is sometimes brought up as a framework to understand how a less powerful combatant will win over a numerically, technologically, logistically, and financially superior opponent as some soft of fait acompli and triumph of the will. 4GW needs to be put into it’s own context, and understood as distinct from insurgent, partisan, and revolutionary warfare in the conventional sense.
A quick examination of the attributes of a 4th Generation Actor: (doctrinally) Lack of Hierarchy, Lack of Formal Structure, Patience and Flexibility. Contrary to the original assertions of the theory, the current 4GW combatant can be a state actor. This was proven out in the early part of the Ukrainian war in Donetsk and Lughansk, the Russian “LGMs” (little green men), a conventional third-generation military, were removing their insignia and fighting against the Ukrainian military in a protracted conflict for the region. While the Russian LGMs likely were not working under a normal hierarchy, or formal structure, and were likely given wide latitude to conduct operations.
What is interesting about the 4GW combatant enlarges the battle space from simple military conflict to a much broader set of domains: economical, political, the media, military, and civilian. Perhaps what differs most when it comes to 4GW, is the ability to dial up the amount of force used. In many cases, few people look at Lawfare, and Economic warfare in the same context as armed conflict and may often see even basic subterfuge, sabotage, and espionage in law enforcement terms rather than seeing these efforts as the military actions they really are. The use of the courts, the media, as a means of achieving a desired result without having to resort to violence is a key difference between a 4th generation fight and an insurgency.
Because of the perceived overlap between 4GW, insurgency, it’s necessary to take a quick look at some of the thinking about insurgency, but from a counter-insurgency perspective. (There are not enough well defined sources to have such a crystal clear doctrine from the insurgent side) The counterpoint to the 4GW narrative, here are three quotes taken from the summary of “How Insurgencies End” by Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki published by the RAND institute:
Insurgency Is Suited to Hierarchies and Rural Terrain – Unified hierarchies do better at insurgency than do fragmented networks. Most insurgencies consist of a hybrid of these two models, but urban insurgencies tend to be more networked than their rural counterparts. This finding is closely linked to the finding that insurgencies rarely succeed in middle-income and urbanized countries. Insurgency is an endeavor best practiced in rural, or a mix of rural and urban, terrain.
There is a pattern in the field of armed conflict, in that victory always favors the organized. The 4GW actor may still have a hierarchy, but it may be hidden under other layers, perhaps doctrine, tribal ties, or simple culture. These are well defined attributes of the major Muslim terror groups Al Queda and ISIS. Even when their leadership catches N Hellfire missiles, they have N+1 leaders.
Weak Insurgents Can Win – Insurgents do not need to be militarily strong to win, and, in fact, military strength can backfire if the threat of insurgent military victory galvanizes government security forces. In cases of long-running insurgencies, like those in Colombia and Sri Lanka, the government was able to reinvigorate COIN efforts even in the face of powerful insurgent cadre (in this case, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and the Tamil Tigers of Eelam).
The counter example of this would be the American Civil Rights movement. The use of the media, lawfare, to achieve their political goals.
Sanctuary Is Vital to Insurgencies – Availability of sanctuary directly correlates with an improved likelihood of insurgent victory, but only if it is provided voluntarily. Insurgencies rarely survive or succeed without some kind of sanctuary. Internal sanctuary is also very valuable, perhaps as valuable as voluntary, external sanctuary.
All combatants at some level depend on having their own support infrastructure, and usually having the support infrastructure in a place that isn’t normally bombed, raided, arrested, sued, or in some way harassed is an absolutely critical feature. The Taliban kept the tribal areas of Pakistan as a summer home when things got too hot, LGMs could move back and forth relatively freely between Russia and Ukraine. The FARC had the jungles of Columbia, and the support of friendly elements in Venezuela. By comparison, the 4th Generation Al Qaeda can evaporate and reform somewhere else. There are new threats on the horizon, and new examples of 4GW to be seen.
While insurgencies and 4GW can sometimes mimic each others behavior, they tend to be distinct. 4GW is viable and effective well below the conflict level most would even consider an armed conflict, in part, because it doesn’t waste it’s time waiting for certain thresholds to be met before it engages parts of it’s apparatus in the fight. While the idea has been well applied elsewhere, insurgency tends to treat violence like a light switch: on or off. A 4GW actor uses a dimmer switch. Whether it’s using NGOs or proxies to engage in Lawfare, tying an adversary up in the court, bullying organizations to go after their adversaries, or simple influencing media organizations to change narratives to their liking, a 4GW adversary might be working against you without you even knowing it.
This article was geared towards the would-be users. In the near future it must be revisited as an adversarial example. This is likely to be much more controversial, and may not be published here.