Communication can take many forms, whether verbal, written, or conveyed via body language. Each of these conforms to a syntax and a set of rules that are often influenced by culture and tradition. Radio, is no different in this respect, in that it has it’s own syntax, rules, and culture.

This article is intended to cover some of the technical basics of Radio Communication, as well as some of the syntax, rules, and cultural norms, before beginning, there is one caveat, this article is written by someone from North America, who is a native English speaker, other regions and those fluent in other languages may have different syntax, rules and culture, again, this is just an introduction.

Technical Terms

Radio is inherently a technical subject, and there are a large number of terms that are rather unique to radio that make up the basic lexicon. It is important to define these first, so the rest of the article makes sense.

Band – a range of frequencies that are used for communication. Many radios are only capable of transmitting on a relatively narrow set of frequencies, and these frequencies may have common features, so they are often referred to in this way. A band will either be expressed as a frequency usually in megahertz, or in meters which refers to the wavelength.

Radio – it is important to note, a radio can be a transmitter, a receiver, or a transceiver.

Bandwidth – the range of frequencies the transmitter can transmit and the receiver can receive, this can be thought of as what range of audio can be transmitted and received, so how low and high of a pitch without distortion or clipping.

FM/AM/SSB – Frequency Modulation usually has the most bandwidth and the best audio, however it is best suited to higher frequencies. Amplitude Modulation still has good audio quality, but uses significantly less bandwidth than FM. SSB or Single Side Band is a refinement of AM which uses even less bandwidth but often allows a radio to transmit at higher power with the narrower signal. It is worth noting there are upper and lower Side Bands.

CW – “Continuous Wave” is used for what most people would recognize as Morse code. It does have wider applications using Digital Modes. Compared to FM/AM/SSB CW uses the least bandwidth and allows the transmitter to turn more electrical energy into signal than any other mode.

Digital Modes – There are two common uses of digital modes, those that use one of the above audio modes to transmit data, and systems such as DMR and P25 which use data to encapsulate voice.

Simplex – Most people are familiar with this mode of operation from cheap handheld walkie talkies, the signal is transmitted and received on the same frequency.

Repeater – A repeater is a somewhat more complex device that consists of a receiver, a transmitter and some specialized hardware that allows the machine to receive a signal on one frequency, and simultaneously transmit it on another. The difference between the transmit and receive frequency is called the Split. Repeaters are usually elevated on the tops of mountains or buildings and provide Line of Sight coverage for an area. Cross Band repeaters will have much greater spacing between the transmit and receive frequencies and are usually less complex and may be built into a single radio.

Linked System – Linked systems are groups of repeaters which will not only receive and transmit locally, but may be connected to other repeaters in other places via the internet or radio links allowing significantly wider coverage.

Line of Sight – Radio at higher frequencies tends to act more like light, you can usually see light through trees and brush, just not as well. Radio signals behave similarly.

Call Sign – An entire article could be written about the nomenclature and use of call signs. In general, the two most common types of call-signs are ITU-R in the US these are assigned by the FCC, or pseudonymous names taken by their users. In the case of ITU-R call signs they are distinct and assigned by a licensing authority, pseudonyms are chosen by their user and are sometimes duplicated.

Voice Procedure – Again, a complex topic that will only get the most cursory of introductions here. VP is a standard format for initiating and concluding a conversation over the radio, and is a common feature of Nets.

Radio Net – A net is usually associated with an event, either for practice, or to coordinate some other activity, usually an emergency response. There is typically a Net Control operator, who will take requests from Stations (operators/users) and then service that request (answer the question, provide information, elevate a request to a higher level, share information with other stations etc). It is a very valuable technique but requires practice and relies heavily on Voice Procedure.

Use Considerations

Since the terminology is out of the way, more will certainly be added, however hopefully the meaning of the words can be gleaned from inference. Rather than dividing things into the types of equipment available, starting small, and getting bigger is the organization method chosen.

Tactical Concerns – When most consider radio communications, tactical communication is usually the first thing that come up. Putting a small handheld radio on your plate carrier, backpack or LBE somewhere is always a good way to look cool, and looking cool is sometimes pushed ahead of more practical considerations.

A quick admonishment, one of the most important investments you can make to go with your radio is a pouch or a case, or some other way that will guarantee you do not lose your radio, or allow others to gather information by seeing the front panel of your radio, which often displays the frequency or the name of the Net. If you lose your radio, frequencies, codes, and other information will need to be changed and altered, sometimes this is not a big deal. Other times it is A VERY BIG DEAL. Buy a radio, buy a hand mic, buy or find a pouch that holds your radio securely, test your equipment out and make sure you don’t lose it. Also, dummy cord the radio to your LBE.

With that out of the way, more there is more important business to attend to. Small handheld radios that are useful for this purpose can have a few different attributes, CB, MURS, GMRS/FRS, Part 90, and Part 97 radios (this references the Federal Codes that gives the FCC authority over these portions of the spectrum), have different uses, CB handhelds are usually very bulky but can be very useful for if you need to interoperate with truck drivers. However, CB is power limited, AM only (sometimes SSB) and often has problems with jamming. Over-all CB is so limited unless a specific use case is needed, it should simply be avoided.

MURS is like CB, however it is significantly higher frequency starting at about 150-156mhz, it is fairly common to find commercial stores using MURS radios, occasionally their security will use it too. It is FM which greatly improves voice quality and has good propagation properties, but is power limited to 2W. It’s not uncommon to find Pirates using the MURS band, usually they have modified ham radios or Part 90 commercial radios, and may be transmitting at up to 50W. While buying a MURS dedicated radio is not really a good buying decision, there is equipment out there, and the 5 channels available to MURS radios should at least be on the list of frequencies to monitor.

GMRS/FRS, these radios are not as common as they used to be, however some variation of them is frequently encountered. GMRS/FRS is intended mostly for family use, it technically does require a license to operate in the GMRS band however there are many who do not bother with the license. GMRS specifically offers a wider FM frequency allocation and more power (up to 25W) repeaters can also be used on GMRS. Unlike MURS and CB equipment, GMRS is worth considering, even if it does come with some peculiar headaches. It has good propagation, and can be very useful in the squad role, but with a repeater can also act as both a squad and a net radio.

Part 97 radios are those classically referred to as HAM or amateur radios. Depending on a number of factors it’s fairly common to find a Part 97 radio that will transmit on 6m (50-54mhz), 2m (144-148), 1.2 (220mhz), and 70cm (430-450). These radios will often have really desirable features such as wide-band receive and may be able to receive AM as well as FM. These radios come with some very major advantages over every other radio mentioned so far, the are frequency agile (they don’t use fixed channels), are designed to talk to repeaters, have swappable antennas, etc. In the author’s experience there are two major caveats: Cost, Licensing, and Battery life.

Many ham radios have been pushed to be smaller than is practicable, and often have strange form factors. Sometimes the capabilities of the radio make up for deficiencies in other places. Looking at the features and costs is an important part of choosing a radio, this also includes the complete ecosystem of programming cables, antennas, batteries, and spare parts.

Lastly, there are Part 90 radios, these are most often referred to as commercial radios, and have a feature set that overlaps with Part 97 radios, but may be deficient in some areas. Part 90 radios are most often single band, however more of them are available with two or more bands, but costs grow significantly. Because commercial radios have so many applications
The original Baofeng UV5R was a Part 90, however it has been reclassified as a Part 97 after having the range which it can transmit limited. Further discussion of Part 90 Radios will be reserved for later in this article.

Tactical and Area Operations – while still staying in the VHF+ portion of the spectrum (>150mhz) repeaters and mobile are the next step up, usually having larger antennas, they may be purpose built and strategically located to give the widest area coverage possible. However, as was noted in the Terms section, cross band repeaters can be used tactically by being mounted in vehicles, or can be small enough to be deployed by a few people in a few minutes.

A repeater is almost always the purview of ham and commercial radios, since this work is geared towards neophytes, a conventional repeater is likely out of the reach from a technical and cost perspective of all but the most dedicated. These systems tend to be purpose built, require licensing and the consent of the coordination bodies in a region. Learning what repeaters are available in an area and how to use them is the simplest path to acquire skill needed to one day own and operate a repeater. That said, cross band repeat is well within the capability of the newbie, and is a feature built into many dual band mobile radios.

Digital Radio and Encryption – This is one of those topics everyone wants to know about, however it’s such an expansive topic, it can be difficult to find a beginning. Of the above radios we’ve talked about thus far, Part 90 is the only type in which encryption is legally allowed. However, in many cases, using a digital radio even without encryption may be a sufficient barrier to entry for many eavesdroppers. The two most common digital modes available are DMR (Digital Mobile Radio, originally a Motorola standard), and P25, which was standardized by a consortium of radio manufacturers and is the nominative standard in digital radio. DMR offers the lowest barrier to entry for encryption, unlike P25, DMR can have keys loaded from software when the memory is being programmed. This is a significant advantage as it does not require a dedicated hardware device called a KVL (Key Value Loader), however it comes at the expense of fairly easy to break encryption. For those interested, DMR most often uses 48 or 64 bit DES encryption (I’ve seen as low as 32 in some radios), in 2001, breaking 40 bit DES was possible in under 2 minutes.

By contrast, P25 radios usually have a dedicated module inside them that handles all the cryptographic processes. However, this board usually costs $1-200 as of this writing, the radio it goes in to may cost another $300-6000 (yes, thousand) depending on features, capabilities etc. Additionally, in order to load new cryptographic keys into the radio a KVL, or some rather advanced infrastructure must be set up. Even architecting such a system usually requires a dedicated team of full time individuals.

A final note on DMR, DMR does have one very large advantage in the ham radio context, in that there are very large networks that connect very wide areas and will pass DMR traffic between multiple repeaters provided users are all tied to the same talk group. This gives DMR a very significant advantage at the cost of a lot of complexity. Also, DMR radios are not particularly expensive, and units like the MD-380 and 390 are in the sub-$150 range. It’s worth noting, that DMR radios are capable of talking to conventional radios as well.

Wide Area Communications – At frequencies lower than are really useful for anything above there is the HF spectrum. This is usually best thought of as 30mhz and lower (~10m). While the 10m band shares some properties of both the VHF and the HF band, it tends not to be used in that way very often.

Most wide area communications are going to happen on HF, in either AM or SSB, maybe CW if someone is really dedicated, however any of these transmission modes can be used fairly easily with digital programs like fldigi which is a program that will use any HF radio’s audio input to transmit in a number of digital modes, using an AFSK input. Any of these digital modes, would allow a user to communicate with another station by typing a message into a keyboard, and “sending” over the radio. If combined with the proper hardware, this will key (tell the radio to transmit) the radio, and then send some warbling over the air where it can be received and decoded by another computer, attached to a radio. In many cases, if one-way communication is acceptable an RTL-SDR dongle can be used as a receive only radio, and can be a listening station capable of receiving, storing, or decoding the messages which can then be forwarded in some other way.

FLDIGI is a more than just a single program, but something of a suite of programs that provide a significant amount of service and capability. Even without access to an HF radio, FLDIGI can be used to send digital messages much faster over VHF and UHF links by selecting a higher baud rate. Also, since FLDIGI operates as an audio program, experimentation can be done simply using the built in speakers and microphones in most laptop computers. Give it a try!

Just Listening – That old saying “you were born with one mouth, but two ears” has a lot of merit and is actually a peculiar skill when it comes to radio. Being able to scan the airwaves, determine what a signal is, receive it, decode it, and determine what it means may be a remarkably valuable skill in the future, and it’s one that can be undertaken with the bare minimum of hardware.

Several years ago someone determined that a particular brand of USB receiver dongles that was intended to receive European digital TV contained a set of chips that also made them very capable receivers when combined with the right software. Much time has passed, and there are now very good, nearly professional products available for very bargain basement prices. A DTV-B dongle can still be purchased for a few dollars, however RTL-SDR now makes very professional dongles that are optimized for receiving and analyzing signals, when combined either with SDR-Sharp (PC, Mac, Linux) or SDR-Touch (Android).

Just listening allows the reception of satellite imagery from NOAA and METEOR weather satellites, as well as the ability to monitor a number of frequencies from the haunting sounds of Numbers Stations, to the Communist rhetoric of Radio Havana, Christian Broadcasts towards South America, and International News from ABC (Australia), NHK, and others which still broadcast in the short-wave band.

Conclusions and Next Steps

While great care was taken not to present this topic in the deep exquisite detail that might give the reader the perception that this is less of a skill-set and more an eldritch horror that sprung from the minds of Marconi and Tesla, that was entirely unintentional. It is a complex topic that deserves complex answers, but with all things, doing is a more practical means than reading.

The first step, would be to get some variety of Baofeng (this is now the generic term) from either Aliexpress, or Banggood, yes, it is available from Amazon, however there seems to be stricter control, and the transmit frequencies are clipped to either GMRS or the Ham bands. The unclipped versions (Part 90) will typically have a transmit range of 117-174mhz and 400-520mhz. (400-480 is also common), a programming cable (look for one with the CH340 chipset, it usually says), a hand mic, and maybe an antenna upgrade, and a larger battery. Download ChiRP, learn to program the radio, look at the Band Plans. Without a license, stick to using MURS and GMRS/FRS, buy two radios and try them out with the help of a friend.

After building up some familiarity and skill, consider getting an amateur radio license. The additional license greatly opens up new opportunities to learn how to use repeaters, and consider buying a mobile radio with cross band repeat. It’s only a matter of time before the skills to use DMR radios is within reach, and higher.

The most important aspect of radio, is to acquire these skills now. Don’t buy all the gear, stick it in a closet, and then wait for the day you really need it to pull it out and start reading the manual.

This is a re-posted from a twitter thread on Oct 5 by @LysanderTheGod While we may not like the conclusion of the conflict, we had best learn from our mistakes so as not to repeat them.

1- Unattachment
I used to be an interrogator with the objective of finding out more information about “terrorists” and their plans. We had to use “sanctioned” emotional techniques in order to get information.

Let’s just say none of the techniques we used would work on the Taliban. Why?

These dudes were so unattached to any of the shit that we here in the West are attached to. It may sound like they are cold, but they didn’t care about the dumb shit we do. Why? Because they didn’t have any of the dumb shit we do. We couldn’t threaten his position in a corporation, or his job in general, which would then put his family at risk… because he didn’t have one.

We couldn’t threaten his social position, or his bank accounts, or his house, or anything really for that matter, because they didn’t have the same pain points that we do here in the West. Furthermore, due to their religion and culture, they were just generally more unattached from possessions and more connected to their cause, Allah, and their fellow warriors.

2- Warrior Culture
Now, some would say, “you could threaten his position in the Taliban”. These dudes knew we would do that so they trained against that defense. The fact is, captured Taliban were more scared of what the Taliban would do to them, if they ratted, than what we would do to them. This is where the warrior culture came in.

Taliban were raised to be warriors from childhood, and most Taliban had a lineage of fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers who were also part of the warrior class. Pashtuns were the tribe that most of these men belonged to, and that’s the Tribe they were warriors for.

The Taliban were in essence just Pashtuns fighting a new battle against us, the invaders. Due to their warrior culture, these men were more concerned with their reputation within the tribe than within our model. These men were also tough, and had been through far worse than anything we Americans have been through, so spending time away from their mud hut wasn’t that big of a deal. The only thing they had to do was not rat so when they came home they were still welcomed as a brother.

3- Higher Purpose
As crazy as this sounds to us Westerners, these men were driven by the “divine”. That was their purpose. They were willing to go toe to toe with the baddest Military in the world because they believed they were ordained through God to protect their land. They were also driven by the belief that their way of life, through Islam, was far better and they were willing to fight and die to defend it. This just goes to show that the spirit of man is the greatest fighting force and tool in the Universe.

When the spirit is aligned with a higher purpose, there is no stopping the men who are on that mission. The greatest armies can fall to tribesmen whose beliefs are so pure in their purpose and calling. Compare this to the US’ purpose and you can understand the outcome.

4- Decentralize
The Taliban, or Afghans in general, are very decentralized people. They are scattered in different tribes and towns all throughout Afghanistan. They don’t have banking institutions, they don’t have malls, they don’t have neighborhoods. Everything they do is decentralized to the core. When they want to connect and achieve something together, it is done through low level communication. This low level communication is either done through walkie talkie, cell phone, or in person, and they are very good at being disciplined in this manner.

If they want to move money, they call people and tell x person to give it to y person, then they will have a courier bring more money to repay x person. They have a system of trust and word. Because it is all people and communication oriented, a man must keep his word or be ousted from the system. Because the system is established through reputation, word, and face to face interactions, it makes it very difficult for other people to enter into it and corrupt it, and due to the warrior culture, if someone does try to harm this system, they are killed and it’s justified

5- Know Your Enemy
When I got out to the more kinetic environments, I began to really witness and understand how the Taliban fought. As I would speak to my sources, or interrogate guys we busted, I began to learn more about what they knew about us. Nothing is more demoralizing than knowing that your enemy knows all your tactics, timelines, movements, and objectives. These guys would tell me all those things about us.

“You can only hold me for 3 days before you have to move me or let me go, I can hold out longer”

“You Americans can’t beat me, you have to feed me 3x a day, and you have to let me pray 5x a day. I’m happy here”

“You found me digging a hole, but I didn’t have any weapons or anything, you have to let me go”

These men knew everything about our operations because we publicized everything. We had zero advantages over them, and they knew it.

6- Own Your Land
The Taliban were always watching us, every hour of every day they had someone watching our bases, our patrols, and all of our movements. When we weren’t patrolling, they were planting IEDs along the path that we patrolled earlier. 24/7/365 these men observed and moved around their terrain to get the advantage on us while we sat in our FOBs and rested, ate food, lifted weights, and cleaned our gear. They were always 3-5 steps ahead of us because of this.

The Taliban were so good at dominating the land, that in Sangin AFG we were practically isolated to our base. The Taliban had practically surrounded our base with IEDs that every patrol we went on, either on foot or in a vehicle, we would hit one or two, either causing damage to our vehicles or killing/injuring our men. They owned the land.

7- “We have the Time”
I was in a Shura at one point, talking to key Taliban leaders in the area and key Afghan tribesmen and diplomats.We were attempting to find out what they needed, from a Western mindset, to see if we could reach a ceasefire, and help build infrastructure. Needless to say, it didn’t pan out well because they didn’t want our Western way of life and looked at us as invaders. They said they wanted us out! To which we said that wasn’t going to happen any time soon so we needed to work together.

Then this one Taliban leader spoke up and said…
“We have pushed the Soviets from these lands before, we are not worried. You see, you Americans may have the watches… but we have the time”

Right there I realized the game they were playing versus the game we were playing and we weren’t ready to play that game.

8- Use What You Got
Let’s be honest, when it came to equipment and technology, the Taliban were hundreds of years behind us, but why were they so effective? Why were they able to win? It’s because they used what they had to the fullest extent. The L-shaped ambush spawned from a detonated IED was their main attack and we knew it, but we couldn’t do anything to stop it. The IED was their main means of attack, and it was massively effective.

Their IEDs were made from fertilizer put into palm jugs with little metal and buried properly to evade detectors. The pressure plates were hidden so well we couldn’t see them and the pressure plate itself was the perfect device for vehicles and foot soldiers.

Once an IED would go off, the Taliban would engage from well hidden locations in a specific formation at a max effective range. They would rarely engage openly. This method may not seem effective to most, but what it was meant to do is keep us busy and isolated enough where our injured from the blasts would most likely die, and due to the pressure, would cause us to make mistakes. It was a war of attrition, not a direct battle.

9- Pick Your Battles
The Taliban used this same strategy to know when to fight openly and when not to. They mostly operated from the IED/L shape, but would also know when to fight and emasse to cause a bigger stir. These guys knew the politics and played it well to their hand. They would only attack en masse when they needed to push something politically or there were optics. This would then lead to the media having some presence, and from there, they would claim the US killed X amount of civilians. Even if it weren’t true, they would make a spectacle of it.

The Taliban also knew when they were outgunned and out classed and they wouldn’t engage. Furthermore, they would implement tactics which they knew we were not willing to engage in. They were there to win at all costs, we weren’t, and they knew how to bring the fight to their terms.

10- Merit Based
This is the last thing I truly noticed about their organization which I was really impressed with. Of course they had a rank structure and hierarchy like any other organization did, but what was different about them versus us is that they allowed for anyone who was a true leader to rise up. There was one leader in Sangin who was my age at the time, 26 years old, and he was the best fighter amongst the Taliban in Sangin. Most of the Hajis were older with grey beards and such but not this guy. He rose up quickly due to his merit and was highly esteemed by the community. He was also a tough SOB. The biggest factor about this guy was his ability to inspire and he motivated the Taliban to fight harder and keep going. His reputation for not being killed or captured grew him an even bigger reputation. Younger men quickly became inspired to be like him and took up cause.

This led to more and more foot soldiers for the Taliban in the area and the promotion of other men into leadership roles. The more these men achieved, the more funding and prestige they would garner. It was one of the best strategies the Taliban implemented!

I hope you enjoyed this thread as I was able to learn a lot from my experience. If you are interested in being coached by me to overcome your personal fears to learn to strive in the direction you want to grow, send me a DM for a personal consult!

Lind’s contribution to modern thought about irregular conflicts is both widely accepted, as well as widely disagreed with. It is undoubtable that 4GW as it has come to be known is derivative of previous types of war, but also more complex than the four pages Lind penned over 30 years ago. Life is about experience, and with new experiences we can put past experience into context. Re-reading the old works we may have learned from in our youth may give us new insights into the circumstances we find ourselves in today. For this reason, I present this article.

William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR)

Marine Corps Gazette
October 1989, Pages 22-26

The peacetime soldier’s principal task is to prepare effectively for the next war. In order to do so, he must anticipate what the next war will be like. This is a difficult task that gets continuously more difficult. German Gen Franz Uhle-Wettler writes:

“At an earlier time, a commander could be certain that a future war would resemble past and present ones. This enabled him to analyze appropriate tactics from past and present. The troop commander of today no longer has this possibility. He knows only that whoever fails to adapt the experiences of the last war will surely lose the next one.”

The Central Question

If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three distinct generations. In the United States, the Army and the Marine Corps are now coming to grips with the change to the third generation. This transition is entirely for the good. However, third generation warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918. It is now more than 70 years old. This suggests some interesting questions: Is it not about time for a fourth generation to appear? If so, what might it look like? These questions are of central importance. Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.

Our purpose here is less to answer these questions than to pose them. Nonetheless, we will offer some tentative answers. To begin to see what these might be, we need to put the questions into historical context.

Three Generations of Warfare

While military development is generally a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has witnessed three watersheds in which change has been dialectically qualitative. Consequently, modern military development comprises three distinct generations.

First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon.

Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field.

While ideas played a role in the development of second generation tactics (particularly the idea of lateral dispersion), technology was the principal driver of change. Technology manifested itself both qualitatively, in such things as heavier artillery and bombing aircraft, and quantitatively, in the ability of an industrialized economy to fight a battle of materiel (Materialschlacht).

The second generation saw the formal recognition and adoption of the operational art, initially by the Prussian army. Again, both ideas and technology drove the change. The ideas sprang largely from Prussian studies of Napoleon’s campaigns. Technological factors included von Moltke’s realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph.

Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack.

While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918, the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart’s indirect approach) to time. This shift was explicitly recognized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Col John Boyd and his “OODA (observation- orientation- decision- action) theory.”

Thus we see two major catalysts for change in previous generational shifts: technology and ideas. What perspective do we gain from these earlier shifts as we look toward a potential fourth generation of warfare?

Elements That Carry Over

Earlier generational shifts, especially the shift from the second to the third generation, were marked by growing emphasis on several central ideas. Four of these seem likely to carry over into the fourth generation, and indeed to expand their influence.

The first is mission orders. Each generational change has been marked by greater dispersion on the battlefield. The fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society. Such dispersion, coupled with what seems likely to be increased importance for actions by very small groups of combatants, will require even the lowest level to operate flexibly on the basis of the commander’s intent.

Second is decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. Dispersion, coupled with increased value placed on tempo, will require a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy.

Third is more emphasis on maneuver. Mass, of men or fire power, will no longer be an overwhelming factor. In fact, mass may become a disadvantage as it will be easy to target. Small, highly maneuverable, agile forces will tend to dominate.

Fourth is a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture. Correct identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly important.

In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.

Potential Technology-Driven Fourth Generation

If we combine the above general characteristics of fourth generation warfare with new technology, we see one possible outline of the new generation. For example, directed energy may permit small elements to destroy targets they could not attack with conventional energy weapons. Directed energy may permit the achievement of EMP (electromagnetic pulse) effects without a nuclear blast. Research in superconductivity suggests the possibility of storing and using large quantities of energy in very small packages. Technologically, it is possible that a very few soldiers could have the same battlefield effect as a current brigade.

The growth of robotics, remotely piloted vehicles, low probability of intercept communications, and artificial intelligence may offer a potential for radically altered tactics. In turn, growing dependence on such technology may open the door to new vulnerabilities, such as the vulnerability to computer viruses.

Small, highly mobile elements composed of very intelligent soldiers armed with high technology weapons may range over wide areas seeking critical targets. Targets may be more in the civilian than the military sector. Front-rear terms will be replaced with targeted-untargeted. This may in turn radically alter the way in which military Services are organized and structured.

Units will combine reconnaissance and strike functions. Remote, “smart” assets with preprogrammed artificial intelligence may play a key role. Concurrently, the greatest defensive strengths may be the ability to hide from and spoof these assets.

The tactical and strategic levels will blend as the opponent’s political infrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be critically important to isolate the enemy from one’s own homeland because a small number of people will be able to render great damage in a very short time.

Leaders will have to be masters of both the art of war and technology, a difficult combination as two different mindsets are involved. Primary challenges facing commanders at all levels will include target selection (which will be a political and cultural, not just a military, decision), the ability to concentrate suddenly from very wide dispersion, and selection of subordinates who can manage the challenge of minimal or no supervision in a rapidly changing environment. A major challenge will be handling the tremendous potential information overload without losing sight of the operational and strategic objectives.

Psychological operations may become the dominant operational and strategic weapon in the form of media/information intervention. Logic bombs and computer viruses, including latent viruses, may be used to disrupt civilian as well as military operations. Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. A major target will be the enemy population’s support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.

This kind of high-technology fourth generation warfare may carry in it the seeds of nuclear destruction. Its effectiveness could rapidly eliminate the ability of a nuclear-armed opponent to wage war conventionally. Destruction or disruption of vital industrial capacities, political infrastructure, and social fabric, coupled with sudden shifts in the balance of power and concomitant emotions, could easily lead to escalation to nuclear weapons. This risk may deter fourth generation warfare among nuclear armed powers just as it deters major conventional warfare among them today.

A major caveat must be placed on the possibility of a technologically driven fourth generation, at least in the American context Even if the technological state of the art permits a high-technology fourth generation and this is not clearly the case — the technology itself must be translated into weapons that are effective in actual combat. At present, our research, development, and procurement process has great difficulty making this transition. It often produces weapons that incorporate high technology irrelevant in combat or too complex to work in the chaos of combat. Too many so-called “smart” weapons provide examples; in combat they are easy to counter, fail of their own complexity, or make impossible demands on their operators. The current American research, development, and procurement process may simply not be able to make the transition to a militarily effective fourth generation of weapons.

A Potential Idea-Driven Fourth Generation

Technology was the primary driver of the second generation of warfare; ideas were the primary driver of the third. An idea-based fourth generation is also conceivable.

For about the last 500 years, the West has defined warfare. For a military to be effective it generally had to follow Western models. Because the West’s strength is technology, it may tend to conceive of a fourth generation in technological terms.

However, the West no longer dominates the world. A fourth generation may emerge from non-Western cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions. The fact that some non-Western areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to develop a fourth generation through ideas rather than technology.

The genesis of an idea-based fourth generation may be visible in terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is fourth generation warfare, but rather that elements of it may be signs pointing toward a fourth generation.

Some elements in terrorism appear to reflect the previously noted “carryovers” from third generation warfare. The more successful terrorists appear to operate on broad mission orders that carry down to the level of the individual terrorist. The ‘battlefield” is highly dispersed and includes the whole of the enemy’s society. The terrorist lives almost completely off the land and the enemy. Terrorism is very much a matter of maneuver: the terrorist’s firepower is small, and where and when he applies it is critical.

Two additional carryovers must be noted as they may be useful “signposts” pointing toward the fourth generation. The first is a component of collapsing the enemy. It is a shift in focus from the enemy’s front to his rear. Terrorism must seek to collapse the enemy from within as it has little capability (at least at present) to inflict widespread destruction. First generation warfare focused tactically and operationally (when operational art was practiced) on the enemy’s front, his combat forces. Second generation warfare remained frontal tactically, but at least in Prussian practice it focused operationally on the enemy’s rear through the emphasis on encirclement The third generation shifted the tactical as well as the operational focus to the enemy’s rear. Terrorism takes this a major step further. It attempts to bypass the enemy’s military entirely and strike directly at his homeland at civilian targets. Ideally, the enemy’s military is simply irrelevant to the terrorist.

The second signpost is the way terrorism seeks to use the enemy’s strength against him This “judo” concept of warfare begins to manifest itself in the second generation, in the campaign and battle of encirclement. The enemy’s fortresses, such as Metz and Sedan, became fatal traps. It was pushed further in the third generation where, on the defensive, one side often tries to let the other penetrate so his own momentum makes him less able to turn and deal with a counterstroke.

Terrorists use a free society’s freedom and openness, its greatest strengths, against it. They can move freely within our society while actively working to subvert it. They use our democratic rights not only to penetrate but also to defend themselves. If we treat them within our laws, they gain many protections; if we simply shoot them down, the television news can easily make them appear to be the victims. Terrorists can effectively wage their form of warfare while being protected by the society they are attacking. If we are forced to set aside our own system of legal protections to deal with terrorists, the terrorists win another sort of victory.

Terrorism also appears to represent a solution to a problem that has been generated by previous generational changes but not really addressed by any of them. It is the contradiction between the nature of the modern battlefield and the traditional military culture. That culture, embodied in ranks, saluting uniforms, drill, etc., is largely a product of first generation warfare. It is a culture of order. At the time it evolved it was consistent with the battlefield, which was itself dominated by order. The ideal army was a perfectly oiled machine, and that was what the military culture of order sought to produce.

However, each new generation has brought a major shift toward a battlefield of disorder. The military culture, which has remained a culture of order, has become contradictory to the battlefield. Even in the third generation warfare, the contradiction has not been insoluble; the Wehrmacht bridged it effectively, outwardly maintaining the traditional culture of order while in combat demonstrating the adaptability and fluidity a disorderly battlefield demands. But other militaries, such as the British, have been less successful at dealing with the contradiction. They have often attempted to carry the culture of order over onto the battlefield with disastrous results. At Biddulphsberg, in the Boer War, for example, a handful of Boers defeated two British Guards battalions that fought as if on parade.

The contradiction between the military culture and the nature of modern war confronts a traditional military Service with a dilemma. Terrorists resolve the dilemma by eliminating the culture of order. Terrorists do not have uniforms, drill, saluting or, for the most part, ranks. Potentially, they have or could develop a military culture that is consistent with the disorderly nature of modern war. The fact that their broader culture may be non-Western may facilitate this development.

Even in equipment, terrorism may point toward signs of a change in generations. Typically, an older generation requires much greater resources to achieve a given end than does its successor. Today, the United States is spending $500 million apiece for stealth bombers. A terrorist stealth bomber is a car with a bomb in the trunk—a car that looks like every other car.

Terrorism, Technology, and Beyond

Again, we are not suggesting terrorism is the fourth generation. It is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven largely ineffective. However, what do we see if we combine terrorism with some of the new technology we have discussed? For example, that effectiveness might the terrorist have if his car bomb were a product of genetic engineering rather than high explosives? To draw our potential fourth generation out still further, what if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following additional elements?

A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion. Our national security capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they have great difficulties. The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traffic has no nation-state base, it is very difficult to attack. The nation-state shields the drug lords but cannot control them. We cannot attack them without violating the sovereignty of a friendly nation. A fourth-generation attacker could well operate in a similar manner, as some Middle Eastern terrorists already do. A direct attack on the enemy’s culture. Such an attack works from within as well as from without. It can bypass not only the enemy’s military but the state itself. The United States is already suffering heavily from such a cultural attack in the form of the drug traffic. Drugs directly attack our culture. They have the support of a powerful “fifth column,” the drug buyers. They bypass the entire state apparatus despite our best efforts. Some ideological elements in South America see drugs as a weapon; they call them the “poor man’s intercontinental ballistic missile.” They prize the drug traffic not only for the money it brings in through which we finance the war against ourselves — but also for the damage it does to the hated North Americans. Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television news. Some terrorists already know how to play this game. More broadly, hostile forces could easily take advantage of a significant product of television reporting — the fact that on television the enemy’s casualties can be almost as devastating on the home front as are friendly casualties. If we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy civilian dead brought into every living room in the country on the evening news can easily turn what may have been a military success (assuming we also hit the military target) into a serious defeat.

All of these elements already exist. They are not the product of “futurism,” of gazing into a crystal ball. We are simply asking what would we face if they were all combined? Would such a combination constitute at least the beginnings of a fourth generation of warfare? One thought that suggests they might is that third (not to speak of second) generation militaries would seem to have little capability against such a synthesis. This is typical of generational shifts.

The purpose of this paper is to pose a question, not to answer it. The partial answers suggested here may in fact prove to be false leads. But in view of the fact that third generation warfare is now over 70 years old, we should be asking ourselves the question, what will the fourth generation be?

One does not fall into the swing of regularly writing, editing and then publishing content. To regularly write, edit, and publish takes an active interest in doing and finishing the job. It is easy to be reactive, it doesn’t require much forethought. It’s much harder to be active, but through discipline this is what we will achieve.

Life, like both thought and art are iterative processes, sometimes they arrive at a conclusion, but the most interesting ones don’t.

The first steps on a new journey were taken recently. Some of the old ground must be tread to tell the story, which is coming soon enough.